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We started this book with the observation that the European and North American democracies fear the negative effects of their attraction to potential migrants from all over the world. They wish to channel and control migration and thereby shape the world according to their own policies and interests. To be able to do so, they have to engage in both national and international political bargaining processes that are tied to contemporary forms of migration management. Such negotiations usually fail to focus on the subjects of the policy choices-the migrants themselves. The aim of this book project is to shed light upon the interrelations between immigration policies and migrants' choices of moving across and around borders. As stated in the introduction, we want to understand how immigration policies affect migrant's journeys and vice versa.
In this chapter, we draw empirical and theoretical conclusions based on the various analyses contained in this volume that focus on the European and U.S. migration regimes. We conclude that immigration policies have a multitude of unintended effects which affect both migrants and governments in the countries of origin, transit, and arrival.
This chapter begins with an overview of the interest policies inside and outside the 'defended' territories. In the U.S. a lucrative internal market of border control has emerged, whereas the EU's externalized border control includes the neighboring countries. The second part describes the unintended effects arising due to inconsistent general policies of the countries of arrival and origin, which often contradict the official immigration policies. Following this, the limited effect of border control measures on immigrants and their journeys are discussed. In the fourth section we explore in more detail the unintended effects in the form of new areas of cooperation, including new forms of self-organization, local interest groups, and sanctuary movements. The final section summarizes the various unintended effects and offers recommendations for decision makers in the field of migration policy.
Interest Policies Inside and Outside 'Defended' Territories
The articles reveal that all of the actors involved in the migration control process-countries of arrival, origin, and transit, as well as the immigrants themselves-pursue their own interests. Both of the two receiving regions under examination, the EU and the U.S., employ a defensive approach to immigration control. One could say that the aim of their policies is to build a castle with a moat around it. However, while the U.S. focuses on domestic solutions to defend its borders, the EU has increasingly externalized its border control, creating unintended effects concerning the necessary political negotiations with its neighboring countries, as discussed below.
The U.S. chooses a rather militaristic defense strategy to protect its territory from unwanted 'intruders' who come mainly from and via its southern neighbor Mexico. In 2006, the U.S. government decided to erect a 700-mile border fence along the U.S.-Mexican frontier (US 2006) 1 . This is the latest in a series of restrictive policies aimed at preventing undocumented immigrants from crossing the border to the U.S. by controlling und monitoring the border. Similar to the EU, the U.S. border control and surveillance measures are extremely technology-driven. Border surveillance has become a highly lucrative business. Private corporations involved in this market pay big money to support their allies in the U.S. Congress and to lobby for a continuation of the walling-off of the country (see Staudt/Garcia-Rios in this volume). Immigration control thus follows its own economic dynamics, which is also stimulated by anti-immigrant reporting in the media. The U.S. control and surveillance efforts are supported by certain segments of the population. As Staudt/Garcia-Rios and Bloch/Rocha Silva point out, civil society actors have also been involved in reporting illegal border crossings and supporting national border guards.
The EU is also attempting to protect itself from unwanted migrants by strengthening the control of its borders around its territory (EU 2006; 2008a) . It has established various protective/defensive circles around its territory that are reminiscent of the moats around medieval castles, the castle wall being its external borders and the moat the EU's neighboring countries and the more distant third countries. This form of externalization is one key characteristic of the EU's migration control policy which Gil Araújo analyzes in her article. This means that migration control has been complemented by control measures outside EU territory. These politics of "concentric circles" were 1 The government of Greece, the main entrance to the EU for undocumented migrants from Turkey, recently planned to copy the U.S.-American fence. Although the EU Commission disapproved of this plan, it became clear that some actors within the EU favor a U.S.-like militaristic defense strategy to deal with undocumented migration.
introduced by the Austrian EU presidency in 1998. A major general objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU's global approach to migration (EU 2008b) is to involve the neighboring countries in the control of migration to the EU in order to "strengthen prosperity, stability and security of all" (European Comission: European Neighbourhood Policy). The EU even goes one step further, by trying to persuade transit countries and migrants' countries of origin to assist the EU in controlling migration. A major economic and political player, the EU does not hesitate to use its power. It negotiates on the basis of a reward system, with the main reward being EU accession.
However, countries of origin and transit pursue their own interests as well. Like any other country, they are interested in increasing and promoting prosperity. They rarely have a genuine interest in preventing (transit) migration to the EU or U.S. and only assume the role of 'deputy sheriff' if they are under political pressure or if there is a genuine economic or political incentive. Several articles in this volume suggest that such states act as economic entrepreneurs and therefore may have a rational interest in preventing more of its citizens from emigrating in order to enhance their bargaining power and to increase rewards for their efforts to curb emigration.
Morocco, a transit country, even benefits from irregular migration. Heck has found that many sub-Saharan migrants find themselves stranded in Morocco while trying to reach Europe. The EU pays Morocco €70 million per year to protect its borders and prohibit undocumented migration to Europe. This deal has led to a strange system of gratification. Morocco justifies these generous payments by the large number of apprehensions at its borders. There is but one problem: According to Heck, the Moroccan border guards systematically defraud the European authorities of large amounts of money by playing a cat-and-mouse game. They catch the same migrants over and over again, take them a few kilometers behind the border, and wait for them to pass through Morocco again, thus altering the statistics in favor of Morocco every time the Moroccan guards catch them, which justifies additional payments from the EU.
In her investigation of political incentives Bilecen-Süoglu shows that the prospect of EU accession was one of the key motivating factors for Turkey to change and restrict its migration regime, highlighting Turkey's difficulties in defining a genuine national interest in migration matters. Turkey actively sought to comply with the EU's demands, notably the implementation of the Schengen acquis, until it became evident that the EU member states are divided over whether Turkey should become a full EU member. Since then, Turkey has significantly reduced its efforts to implement EU standards. Indeed, if it turned out in a few years that Turkey's accession to the EU is all but certain, the country may actually lose all motivation to further strengthen and restrict migration to the EU. For transit migrants, Turkey's position in the European migration regime is of utmost importance. Turkey is the bridge between Asia and Europe and is still an important route for regular and irregular migration to the EU.
Haase has made similar observations. Ukraine, formerly a transit country, has become a reluctant country of arrival since it started implementing the migration control measures demanded by the EU. As a result, it has become an 'immigration country of second choice', for migrants who are on their way to the EU and who often find themselves stranded in Ukraine. However, the country lacks the infrastructure and experience to deal with immigrants, and the existing xenophobic trends in Ukraine have become worse as a result of this situation. Although Ukraine hopes for EU accession and is therefore willing to deal with this situation, it would be wrong to interpret its efforts to implement EU standards as docile eagerness to please the EU. After all, Ukraine was quite able to pursue its own interests in the negotiations of EU visa facilitation for Ukrainian nationals in exchange for the readmission agreement demanded by the EU.
Obviously, the carrot-and-stick strategy of the EU may prove rather costly, including the possible unintended effects described above. The economic approach of rewarding its neighbors and other transit countries for complying with its political objectives often works out only on paper. Moreover, the EU risks getting blackmailed. It expects the major transit countries such as Morocco, Turkey, and Ukraine to do the 'dirty work' of keeping migrants out. But transit states are rational actors. The willingness of these countries to comply with the EU's demands depends on the (perceived) benefits and costs in each transit state. If these countries were to find that their costs exceed their benefits, they might ask the EU for greater financial compensation. They may also cooperate with each other to put the EU under severe pressure. Countries with limited prospects of EU accession such as Turkey and Ukraine would have little to lose. Hess's article in this volume also highlights the unintended outcome of the EU transit policies since "the newly labeled 'transit countries' learn to use this categorization for their own power games." Future policy planning should take these observations into consideration.
Unintended Effects of Inconsistent Policies and Economic Interests: The Encouragement of Ongoing Emigration
Migration policies of the U.S. and the EU member states are influenced primarily by economic interests which very often contradict the zero-tolerance approach to undocumented migration. As the following overview shows, economic interests prevail both in the countries of origin and arrival, which also highlights the inconsistent nature of existing anti-migration policies.
Kreienbrink describes the interest of the Spanish government in regularizing migrants. In his analysis he identifies Spain's labor market as the strongest pull factor to produce unintended effects on EU migration policy. State authorities generally fail to maintain effective internal control, particularly in the agricultural and construction industries, both of which have a constant demand for new labor. This tolerance towards irregular labor gives Spain certain competitive advantages on the macroeconomic level, with possible regularization providing an additional incentive for undocumented migrants to come to Spain. Regularization attempts in Spain and a number of other European countries aimed at furthering national economic interests therefore contradict the EU's immigration policies
In Mexico, the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. (NAFTA) in 1994 only yielded marginal improvements. In fact, it even prevented the intended effects of the anti-migration measures. According to Staudt and Garcia-Rios, it led to increased foreign direct investments and overall productivity, and reduced inflation. However, NAFTA was not able to create sustainable jobs at living-wage levels, which would have made emigration to the U.S. less attractive. Mexicans living in the U.S. transfer large portions of their income home to their families. Unsurprisingly, these remittances are the second most important source of income in Mexico, just after oil exports and before foreign direct investments (Randall 2006) . Mexican remittances figures grew to US$27 billion in 2007 and decreased to US$22 billion in 2009 (World Bank 2011 . Emigration to the U.S. is supported by the Mexican State because migrants remain one of the most important sources of revenue for the Mexican economy.
The case of Senegal reveals another paradox of inconsistent policies. Tsagué shows in this volume that several measures implemented by the EU and European enterprises have aggravated the living conditions in Senegal and have thus proved to be a push factor for emigration to Europe. A good example of this is the overexploitation of the sea along the Senegalese coast by European enterprises, which has been partially tolerated and compensated financially by EU member states 2 . A very poor country, Senegal is in a relatively weaker negotiation position. When the EU cynically asks Senegal to implement measures to prevent irregular emigration -which, after all, was at least partially triggered by European intervention -the Senegalese government is very cooperative because it hopes for better access to the internal EU market and for stronger relations with the EU. Senegal even boasts about its excellent exit control, despite the fact that this contradicts Senegal's national interests. Similar to the situation in Mexico, remittances from Senegalese emigrants are of utmost importance for the country's national economy, but are jeopardized due to tougher controls. As in other countries of transit and origin, this political dilemma has several consequences for the society of Senegal. In the Senegalese culture, the decision to send the member of the family who is most likely to succeed in Europe is made by the family collective, who consider their support as an investment. Pressure on the migrants is very high and many of them do not dare return to Senegal because they fear they will be unable to meet the high expectations. If the Senegalese government wants to bring them back and prevents others from leaving, it has to set up a return policy which can be accepted by the local population and create jobs for those who were designated to leave and must now stay at home.
One can conclude that inconsistent EU and U.S. policies are policies which aggravate the living conditions in potential emigration regions rather than improving them. Negative externalities of such policies as well as national and individual economic interests can significantly reduce the efficiency of anti-migration measures.
Unintended Effects on Migrants' Behavior: The Limited Effects of Border Control
According to the World Migration Report 2010, the number of international migrants has more than doubled in the last four decades, from 82 million in 1970 to about 214 million in 2010 and a projected 405 million in 2050 (IOM 2010: xix) . With the growth of international migration occurring at a time of increasingly restrictive admission policies, unauthorized migration has picked up dramatically in recent years. Nevertheless, it is estimated that only between 10 and 15% of today's international migrants live in an irregular situation (Ibid: 29).
The articles in this volume confirmed empirically that physical barriers do not discourage people from crossing borders. This finding is supported by statements of migrants who succeeded in crossing the border. Naturally, the deterrence capacity of border control and surveillance is difficult to assess, but the interviews with the would-be migrants suggest that the deterrence capacity of border security is limited. Obviously, border control measures are unlikely to deter migrants from migrating if they perceive that they have nothing to lose at home and much to gain in the country of destination. Border fences can do little to keep them from emigrating.
In fact, the articles show that migrants are led by reason and use every means at their disposal to pursue their objectives. The concept of agency-in the sense of the migrant acting as a Homo economicus-thus makes sense for migrants, too. Most migrants show a high degree of initiative and the will to actively shape their lives. In most cases, they are self-determined subjects. Or, to put it conversely: Migrants are not objects that can be controlled by political actors at will. As Friese and Hess point out in their contributions, migrants make their own decisions; they trade off different options and implement their objectives. This requires survival skills, personal resources, and capabilities. For these reasons, a description of migrants should not portray them as victims or as a threat to the security and welfare of Western industrial nations, but as active agents.
The argument that border control has a limited effect on migrants' behavior is also supported by Staudt and Garcia-Rios, albeit from a different perspective. They identify economic factors as the main explanatory variable for immigration rates from Mexico to the U.S. According to their study, border or immigration policies, as far as they exist, are only an intervening variable. Border control and surveillance do influence the way migrants move, but they hardly have any influence on the decision of whether to emigrate or not. As in the Spanish case, economic and immigration policies in the U.S. are not only non-convergent, they are contradictive. While immigration policies try to prevent or even 'fight' irregular migration, the constantly high demand for low-wage labor in the U.S. is a strong incentive for Mexicans to migrate despite legal obstacles. This estimation is complemented by Cornelius, who notes that "immigration law and policy are huge experiments in behavior modification". He points out the helplessness of governments and their inability to intervene in international migration flows, stressing that it is easier for governments to initiate migration flows than to stop them. The budget for the virtual fence between the U.S. and Mexico is tremendous. However, Cornelius' interviews with 4,000 Mexicans in Mexico show that fewer than half of them have been caught crossing the border irregularly. Moreover, border control does not make potential migrants reconsider their decision to emigrate. The economic incentives provided in the U.S. are too attractive and the living conditions in Mexico and further south are too harsh.
The decrease in illegal migration from Mexico to the U.S. in recent years is due mainly to the economic crisis in the U.S. and the lack of employment. Neither interior enforcements such as workplace raids nor a hostile environment affect migrants' decisions to go to the U.S. as strongly. Even many green card holders have left the U.S. But this is not a permanent situation. Cornelius makes it clear that "many stay-at-homes are only postponing migration until the U.S. economy improves." Again, it is the economic interests of some employers that conflict with the government's or society's intention to control and deter undocumented Mexican immigrants.
The same is true for Spain where, according to Kreienbrink, the phenomenon of irregular labor is widely accepted in small enterprises. The possibility of finding employment and being regularized is a strong incentive for migrants to cross borders illegally. Even if regularization is only temporary, it is often a step toward obtaining legal status and noticeably improving their economic and social situation.
In order to avoid the tightened border control, migrants usually take alternative routes, which are becoming increasingly difficult and dangerous. While border control and surveillance may not prevent immigration altogether, they do have an influence on which people migrate, and how they do so. Many migrants are unable to make their journey on their own and have to seek the 'professional support' of people smugglers. This has led to the emergence of a new smuggling market in Europe and at the U.S.-Mexican border over the last two decades. Smuggling profits are even increasing, because the product offered by these entrepreneurs, the chance to cross the border, has become increasingly difficult to obtain.
At the same time, the number of deaths attributed to unauthorized border crossings-i.e., crossings excluding entries with forged passports or crossings with unlawfully obtained visas-is on the increase worldwide. Several thousand people drown or die of thirst on both sides of the Atlantic each year. According to the NGO UNITED for Intercultural Action, there were 13,824 fatal border crossing attempts into the EU between 1993 and 2010 (www.unitedagainstracism.org). Figures for the U.S. are equally dramatic with an average of more than one migrant dying every day along the southwestern border, resulting in over 5,600 officially casualties so far (see Cornelius).
On the whole, one can conclude that the decision to migrate is accompanied by serious unintended effects, such as the emergence of people smuggling and other related crimes, increasing casualty rates, and people being stripped of their individual rights due to their irregular status. With regard to the controversial establishment of EU "transit zones", which are "designated places where rejected migrants are physically detained until they are returned" (Tóth 2006) , it has been critically remarked that irregular migrants are kept from "the full panoply of procedural rights which apply to immigration and asylum" despite the fact that they are subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial state, which remains bound by its international obligations on human rights (Ibid.). Similarly, in this volume Hess criticizes the manifestation of precarious transit zones, which "keep people caught in mobility and transforms border regions into zones of increased circulation […] [that] restrict the social, economic, and political rights of migrants".
Unintended Effects on Alliance Building and the Pending Issue of Legal Rights
Another unintended consequence of migration policies are the new forms of alliance building among the migrants themselves which have developed in recent years but have not yet been adequately described in the academic literature. In addition, the establishment of legal rights for undocumented migrants still remains a contentious issue both in the U.S. and the EU.
Concerning the new forms of alliance building, the articles in this volume observe that migrants on both sides of the Atlantic find new forms of self-organization and micro-politics to deal with their situation of being in transit. In Morocco, for example, irregular migrants live together in the 'underground' in small groups of approximately 10 people. In the desert and in the outskirts of the cities migrants set up makeshift camps. This shows that a completely new form of residence has emerged in Morocco, a fact the Moroccan government refuses to acknowledge. Similar forms of makeshift residences can be observed in Turkey and Ukraine. Ukraine in particular, with its extremely strict border control and surveillance, has become a country where many former transit migrants find themselves stranded and now have to learn to manage their lives there. These cases confirm the observation made in the preliminary studies to this book that migrants organize their lives 'around' border control measures.
Friese describes another form of alliance building that has emerged on the island of Lampedusa. In 2009, something extraordinary happened on the tiny island in the Mediterranean Sea off the Italian coast. Tourism is one of the most important sources of revenue for Lampedusa, but the industry is severely hampered by border surveillance measures on and around the island. In addition, Lampedusa experienced increasing numbers of migrants arriving on its coast. Reception camps were soon overcrowded, and the Lampedusani felt abandoned by the Italian government. When the Lampedusani and the migrants realized they could no longer tolerate this situation, they joined forces and took to the streets of the tiny island together to demonstrate against the policy of the Berlusconi government.
The sanctuary movement in the U.S., though having a different motivation, has had a similar outcome in that it, too, has led to joint demonstrations against stricter immigration policies. In 2006, for example, both documented and undocumented Mexican-born residents demonstrated against stricter immigration policies. According to the article by Bloch and Rocha Silva, the sanctuary movement was initiated by various churches in Los Angeles in the early 1980s. Its aim was to offer asylum for Central American immigrants in churches and synagogues as places for worship and refuge. U.S. citizens who join this movement protect immigrants from detention and deportation 3 . It should be noted that the examples of Lampedusa and the U.S. sanctuary movement are the exceptions that prove the rule. Xenophobic attitudes prevail and the preservation of distinct national identities in EU member states and the U.S. usually prevent the liberalization of immigration policies. However, even where undocumented migrants are not welcome, the regional population and the governments of the countries of arrival have to deal with them. In the long run, they have to consider fundamental issues such as individual rights, health care, and education for undocumented immigrants and their children, as well as for potential migrants who are still waiting for their chance.
At least to some degree, the rights of undocumented migrants are protected under international human rights law (Council of Europe 2007), but the translation into specific EU measures is still lagging behind. Cholewinski notes that, so far, "no specific EU measures have been adopted to protect the rights of irregular migrants, despite statements that fundamental rights, such as access to education for children or basic health care, need to be protected" (Cholewinski 2010: 7f.) . In the U.S., alien rights of undocumented immigrants have been a matter of controversy as well. While Joppke (2001: 343ff.) points out that in the 1970s and 1980s American courts generally used to rule in favor of equal protection rights for illegal aliens, Bloch and Rocha Silva (in this volume) focus on ballot initiatives at the state level that were aimed at banning "undocumented aliens from using health care, welfare, and other public social services", the most prominent example being Proposition 187 in California in 1994. Although this proposition was eventually found unconstitutional, the debate on the issue of alien rights between federal, state, and local legislation still continues today (Thomas 2010 ). An interesting question for future research would be to examine the role migrants and their alliances can play in this process (Hing/Johnson 2006; Laubenthal 2007) .
Summary and Outlook
The analyses presented in this book indicate that the objective of the U.S. and the EU to only allow friends, acquaintances, traders, and business partners to enter their territory has not been achieved. This observation confirms the reports cited in the introduction, of about 1.9 to 3.8 million undocument-ed migrants living in the EU, and over 10 million in the U.S. However, border control and surveillance have become increasingly sophisticated on both sides of the Atlantic. Many enterprises have a great interest in serving decision makers who have a strong enthusiasm for technology. Border management has become a business factor and, at least from a technical point of view, an impermeable border seems to be feasible.
However, the analyses collected in this volume also raise serious doubts as to the efficiency of such a strategy. The existing migration management strategies and inconsistent general policies are already creating various unintended effects. The castle and moat structure described in this chapter is risky and very costly. Inconsistent policies encourage ongoing emigration, but tightened border control does not prevent people from migrating. Rather, the supposedly 'impermeable borders' often give rise to new forms of crime such as people smuggling, which can increase the de facto punishment for undocumented migration to the death penalty, as can be seen from the deaths of thousands of migrants who have attempted to cross the borders in recent years. At the same time, changing policies also stimulate the emergence of new forms of alliances and self-organization which can strengthen the migrants' resources and challenge traditional path-dependent institutions on the regional level. Alliances between migrants are formed throughout their entire journey and continue when dealing with civil society or local residents who support their claims.
Increased technical control measures would only partly prevent these unintended effects because migration policies are complex, cross-sectoral phenomena. Even small adjustments in one policy area can have an immediate effect on others. The approach of today's migration policy, which tends to ignore migrants' interests, the status quo in the countries of origin and transit, and the national interests of all of the countries involved, is often too simplistic and one-dimensional and should therefore be readjusted.
The reasonableness of increasingly strict border regimes becomes even more doubtful when we take into account that migration management is the result of political decisions based on many other aspects not covered in this book. Most Western societies fear that increased migration may result in cultural and religious Überfremdung, the collapse of social security systems, an influx of low-wage foreign laborers, and a xenophobic backlash, among other things. Politicians take these attitudes into account when making policy decisions. There are various examples of the "negative framing of migration" (Guiraudon/Joppke 2001) . Casanova (2006) discusses the fear of terrorism and sleepers, liberal feminist discourses against imported patriarchal fundamentalism, the preservation of a secular tradition in Europe, and a xenophobic nativism. Huysmans (2000) talks about the fear of welfare fraud and the use of immigrants as scapegoats to explain the struggling welfare systems (cf. Beck 2008) . Similarly, Weiner (1995) cites sources which portray migrants as a social or economic burden and a possible threat to cultural identity.
We argue that instead of approaching migration in traditional national categories, a global approach taking into account the inherent global and interconnected facts of migration might create a win-win situation. Receiving societies could benefit from the migrants' knowledge and experience. Particularly in times of demographic change, these societies can benefit from economic migrants while simultaneously increasing the safety of migrants. History clearly shows that multicultural and multiethnic societies are the most advanced. However, the possible consequences of a brain drain for the countries of origin have to be taken into account as well, particularly for laborsending countries that are situated close to labor-receiving countries (Adams 2003) .
Finally, this volume also confirms the institutionalist assumption that even systems with a negative or doubtful performance can be stable and decision makers may not be aware of better alternatives. There are several reasons for this phenomenon: The longer a system exists the higher the costs of changing it, because all actors and contexts have adapted to the situation (David 1985; North 1990 ). For example, in repeated interaction situations the actors' ideas tend to converge. Even where many actors are dissatisfied with the status quo and would like to change it, failure to compromise on alternatives can make it impossible to effect any changes at all. Path dependency is substantiated with the theoretical argument that short-term cycles of issues covered by the media, medium-term cycles of issues at the political agenda, and long-term cycles of values of the society are often incompatible. This leads to the unintended effect that decision makers avoid adjusting political institutions (Wiesenthal 2002) .
So even if the EU and the U.S. were to realize that their migration policies and inconsistent general policies have various unintended effects, it is likely that they will not readjust their policies because the sequence of past events and decisions pre-structures the options for change. Changes to the 'path' are possible, but they should not be expected to come about easily. Such changes are more likely to occur as a result of 'exogenous shocks' (Beyer 2005) , such as if transit countries which have adopted EU-style migration control measures started to blackmail the EU.
The nation-based design of this policy is another factor impeding change in migration control policies. It usually takes a long time for (collective) ideas and core beliefs to change (Scott/Meyer 1994: 234) . Migration control is still adjusted along the concept of the Westphalian state, a nation state whose territory needs to be protected from external enemies. However, more so than any other movement, migration is a cross-border or even a transnational phenomenon (Basch et al. 1997) . The various aspects of transnational networks, which can have cultural, economic, political, or religious dimensions extending between and beyond two or more geographical spaces (Pries 2001; 2008) , must therefore be considered comprehensively, without the limitation of 'methodological nationalism'.
In view of the more than 1,000 official deaths at EU and U.S. borders every year, it remains a delicate and very important task to reach a consensus on the question of whether liberal countries or state unions which are dedicated and committed to protecting human rights, such as the U.S. and the EU, respectively, can bend their liberal ideal to the point of saying that it was the migrants' choice to accept the potential 'death penalty' for crossing the border illegally. Countries of arrival are fully responsible for their border control and surveillance measures and indeed even offer incentives for migrants to come, whether they have proper documents or not.
We hope that this book will provide new empirical material that can serve as a basis for an open and empirically based discussion of the interrelations between immigration policies and migrants' journeys. The articles contained in this volume explore this issue from the joint perspective of political science and ethnography, an approach that has proved extremely fruitful.
The resulting conclusions for policy making are clear: Governments need to take into consideration that negotiation partners may undermine the carrot-and-stick strategy and increase their demands concerning the EU's externalization strategy. Rather than focusing on anti-immigration control alone, countries of arrival should act consistently across all policy sectors which affect countries of origin and transit. Governments would be wise to accept and communicate to their electorate the fact that hermetic borders will never prevent migrants from attempting to immigrate, but only make their journeys more dangerous. Policy makers should therefore reevaluate whether the immense costs and risks of their migration policies are acceptable. Researchers and politicians should endeavor to develop and discuss alternative solutions for a more humane immigration policy that takes into account the active agency of migrants as well as the multilayered interests of their social and political environments.
